Erosion of the Indigenous Right to Negotiate in Australia: Proposed Amendments to the Native Title Act by Cappio, Gretchen Freeman
Washington International Law Journal 
Volume 7 Number 2 
3-1-1998 
Erosion of the Indigenous Right to Negotiate in Australia: 
Proposed Amendments to the Native Title Act 
Gretchen Freeman Cappio 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj 
 Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the Indian and Aboriginal Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Gretchen F. Cappio, Comment, Erosion of the Indigenous Right to Negotiate in Australia: Proposed 
Amendments to the Native Title Act, 7 Pac. Rim L & Pol'y J. 405 (1998). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj/vol7/iss2/7 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington International Law Journal by an authorized editor of UW 
Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
Copyright 0 Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journ Association
EROSION OF THE INDIGENOUS RIGHT TO
NEGOTIATE IN AUSTRALIA:
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE NATIVE TITLE ACT
Gretchen Freeman Cappio
Abstract: The Australian government seeks to amend the Native Title Act,
which presently gives indigenous Australians real property rights by virtue of their
history living on the land. In their present form, the proposed amendments to the
Native Title Act threaten indigenous representation regarding land disputes. The right
to negotiate currently protected by the Act must be preserved, ensuring indigenous
participation as well as consensual and procedural agreement. The government should
not change its course: indigenous parties deserve the same rights today as were granted
just five years ago. Government and indigenous leaders must work cooperatively to
draft new amendments to guarantee an indigenous voice in land dispute resolution under
the Native Title Act.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past two hundred years of European settlement in
Australia, institutional discrimination against the indigenous peoples of
Australia has taken many forms, including governmental policies that
undermined indigenous customs, language, education, and social
structures.' Aborigines' land rights were also discriminated against. As a
result of the doctrine of terra nullius,2 indigenous possession of land was
denied in favor of settlers' claims to the property. Yet in the landmark
1992 case of Mabo v. State of Queensland, the doctrine of terra nullius
was ruled void and indigenous real property rights were finally
recognized. The Native Title Act of 1993 ("NTA") codified the reforms of
Mabo.4
See infra notes 7-13, 17-25 and accompanying text.
2 Terra nullius means "unoccupied land." Ann McGrath, Introduction to CONTESTED GROUND:
AUSTRALIAN ABORIGINES UNDER THE BRITISH CROWN I (Ann McGrath, ed. 1995). See infra text
accompanying notes 35-36 for a further discussion of the doctrine.
3 Mabo v. State of Queensland (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1 (Austl.).
" "Native title" refers to the communal, group or individual rights and interests of Aboriginal
peoples or Torres Strait Islanders in relation to land or water where: "(a) the rights and interests are
possessed under the traditional laws acknowledged. and the traditional customs observed . .. (b) [the
indigenous peoples] have a connection with the land or waters; and (c) the rights and interests are
recognized by the common law of Australia." Native Title Act, 1993, § 223(1) (Austl.).
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In the upcoming 1998 session of Parliament, the Australian
government will consider amending the Native Title Act.5 If Parliament
adopts the proposed 1997 amendments, special interests, such as the
mining industry, will benefit to the detriment of indigenous interests.
Indeed, contracts negotiated in the mining industry exemplify the tension
between indigenous property rights and the interests of others who wish to
claim rights to these lands.6
This Comment asserts that the Australian government must
implement policies that benefit all Australians, including indigenous
peoples, and so should refuse to pass the proposed amendments. This
Comment begins by explaining the importance of land to the indigenous
people of Australia and their treatment from the time of British
colonization up to the present. The Comment then focuses on policies
involving indigenous Australians, including those derived from terra
nullius and the watershed case Mabo. Next, the Comment describes the
Native Title Act, which Parliament passed to codify the judicial holding in
Mabo. The Comment stresses the importance of negotiation while
examining how the right to negotiate operates within the Native Title Act.
The piece asserts that the proposed amendments fail to provide significant
negotiation opportunities for indigenous claimants and are biased in favor
of industry.
The Comment concludes by identifying the tension between the
interest in streamlining the process of asserting native title claims and the
interest in ensuring that all parties have a right to be heard. It
recommends that indigenous parties and the government should draft
amendments together to serve these dual purposes. The Comment also
suggests improvements Parliament could make to the current Native Title
Act to preserve indigenous claimants' right to negotiate.
5 The 1997 amendments to the Native Title Act were defeated by a thin, one-vote margin in Dec.
1997. Laura Tingle, Historic Outing Has Headaches in Store, THE AGE (Melbourne, Austl.), (Dec. 8,1997) <http://www.theage.com.au/daily/971208/news/news8.htm>. The Parliament reached a stalemate
and so conducted a rare emergency Saturday morning meeting on Dec. 6, 1997. Id The reasons for theimpasse were three Senate amendments to the original proposed amendments that the Prime Minister
would not accept. Id. The three Senate amendments that the executive found unacceptable were: the
threshold test for the acceptance of native title claims, the right to negotiate, and the proposal to subject
the Native Title Act to the requirements of the Racial Discrimination Act. Id. Senator Brian Harradine
cast the deciding vote (after changing his mind over lunch with persuasive senators) in favor of rejecting
the amendments, suspending debates for at least four months. David Marr, Harridine's Lunch That Ate
the Wik Bill, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, (Dec. 6, 1997) <http://www.smh.com.au/daily/content/971206/
pageone/pageone3. html>.6 See infra notes 91-97 and accompanying text.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Importance of Land to the Indigenous People ofAustralia
Indigenous Australians, or Aboriginal peoples, and Torres Strait Islanders
7
are the population groups whose ancestors were the original inhabitants of
Australia, predating European settlement.8 Since the time of settlement,
indigenous Australians have been dispossessed of their lands, largely without just
compensation. 9 From the colonial period 0 until this decade, Australia's state
governments have failed to reach fair agreements with Australian Aborigines
regarding the dispossession of their lands." This failure has contributed to
making indigenous people the "most disadvantaged [group] in Australian
society.' 12  Not only have the economic repercussions of terra nullius been
severe, but indigenous Australians' cultural identity has been undercut by these
policies as well. As recognized in the recent proposed amendments to the Native
Title Act, "[1]and is fundamental to ... identity, cultural survival and economic
viability."'
3
The bond between indigenous Australians and the land surpasses the
attachment that most non-indigenous Australians have with their real property.' 4
Land is the Aborigines' source of religion, art, and other forms of culture. 15 It is
said that "[an Aborigine does not own the land but rather is of the land.' 16
B. Historical Discrimination Against Indigenous People
European colonization began in Australia in 1788. 17 At that time, the
indigenous population was approximately 750,000 people. 18 During the time
' The Tones Strait Islands lie off of the northern tip of Australia. The major islands are: Boigu,
Saibai, Dauan, and Thursday. Penny Taylor, Introduction to See AFrER 200 YEARS xiv (Penny Taylor,
ed. 1998).
' Native Title Act, 1993, Preamble (Austi.).
9 Id.
1o The first colonialists came to Australia in 1788. Taylor, supra note 7, at ix.
l Native Title Act, Preamble.
12 Id.
13 Lois O'Donoghue, Foreword, Proposed Amendments to the Native Title Act 1993: Issues for
Indigenous Peoples, available in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (visited Oct. 26,
1997) <http://www.atsic.gov.au/>. Lois O'Donoghue is the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Commission Chairperson. Id.
"4 Id. at 7.
15 Id.
16 IAN C. PALMER, BUYING BACK THE LAND 2 (1988).
"? Id. at 3.
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of colonization, indigenous possession was denied in favor of European
"rights."' 9
From the time of the first European settlers until the late 1960s, the
Australian government managed Aboriginal affairs under assimilationist
policies.20  These policies allowed the day-to-day needs of indigenous
peoples to be met, but they neglected their long-term developmental needs.21
During assimilation, paternalistic attitudes toward Aborigines prevailed
22throughout Australia. Assimilation policies allowed Aborigines to
contribute to the material development of Australia on local and national
levels.23  Yet this process undermined indigenous traditional education,
languages, customs, and social structures.24 Moreover, Aborigines were
pressured to join the labor force, but often at the bottom rung of the job
ladder.25
In the early 1960s, a push started for Aboriginal empowerment in
response to assimilationist policies.26  By 1966, the first organized
demonstrations by Aborigines occurred in the remote north of Australia.27
The next year, after centuries of mistreatment, Aborigines were formally
made Australian citizens in a referendum that amended the Australian
Commonwealth Constitution. The referendum also gave oversight
responsibility for the office of Aboriginal Affairs directly to the federal
government, rather than the states.29  At least in word, indigenous
Australians' desires for autonomy and land rights were legitimized under this
new policy known as "'integration. ' '3" Aboriginal affairs have since been
governed by a long line of specialized agencies.3'
:8 McGrath, supra note 2, at 10.
'9 Id. at 1.
20 ELSPETH YOUNG, THIRD WORLD IN THE FIRST: DEVELOPMENT OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 102 (1995).
21 For example, Aborigines were typically allowed to earn just enough cash to survive. Id. at 103.Their monetary earnings were carefully supervised in their workplaces. Such policies had enduring
effects on indigenous attitudes towards participation in the cash economy. Id.
22 id.
23 id.
24 id.
25 id.
26 Id.
27 As a result of the government's oppressive policies, the Aboriginal workforce in Wave Hill cattle
station walked off and the Gurindji (an indigenous population group) subsequently settled at Wattie
Creek. Id.
28 Id. at 42.
29 Id. at 103.
30 id.
31 Among the agencies that have dealt with Aboriginal Affairs are the: Council for Aboriginal
Affairs, Committee for Aboriginal Affairs, Department of Aboriginal Affairs, Aboriginal Land Fund
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II. THE MABO DECISION
A. Terra Nullius in Australia
During the time of settlement, newcomers justified their means of
acquiring ownership and sovereignty of the Australian continent by claiming
they were bringing the benefits of Christianity, protection, and European
civilization to the Aborigines.32 Their claim to this land was further
buttressed by the legal philosophies of the Spanish and Portuguese.33 Under
policies of physical threat and cultural assimilation dating back to the
sixteenth century, indigenous peoples in Central and South America had very
limited legal rights.34 Like the Spanish and Portuguese, the settlers imagined
that Australian land was ownerless under the doctrine of terra nullius,
meaning "unoccupied land.",35 This doctrine denied indigenous possession of
land in favor of settlers' "rights.
36
Terra nullius was initially supported by the judiciary, to the further
detriment of Aboriginal rights. The first legal test of the doctrine was in
Milirrpum v. Nabalco Pty. Ltd. in 1971 . In Milirrpum, decided by the
Northern Territory Supreme Court, Justice Blackburn based the decision both
on eighteenth-century legal commentaries as well as ethnographic materials. 38
The court reasoned that, although indigenous Australians did have a system of
land tenure, it could not be recognized within the current Australian
conception of legal title because indigenous Australians lived in a "primitive
state of society" and as such should not be entitled to legal ownership of
land.39 This decision was a huge defeat for indigenous Australians who had
been hopeful that the Australian justice system would recognize their interests
Commission, and the Aboriginal Development Commission. The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Commission ("ATSIC"), founded in 1990, is the only agency still existing today. Id. at 104-05. For a
table explaining Australian Commonwealth Aboriginal economic development programs, see id at 107.
32 McGrath, supra note 2, at 130.
33 DAVID H. GETCHES & CHARLES F. WILKINSON, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW CASES AND MATERIALS
36 (2d ed. 1986).
34 id.
35 McGrath, supra note 2, at 1.
36 Id.
37 (1971) 17 F.L.R. 141 (Sup. Ct. N. Terr. Austl.), cited in Nicolas Peterson & Marcia Langton,
Introduction to ABORIGINES, LAND AND LAND RIGHTS 3 (Nicolas Peterson & Marcia Langton, eds., 1983).
38 Id.
39 Id.
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in the land that had been theirs since "time immemorial. ' 4° Milirrpum set the
stage for future indigenous defeats in the courts through 1992. 1
B. Mabo v. State of Queensland
On June 3, 1992, however, the High Court of Australia42 drastically
changed indigenous Australians' "legacy of dispossession. '43  The historic
decision in Mabo v. Queensland44 involved a ten-year dispute in which the
indigenous Meriam people, occupants of the Murray Islands,45 sought
property rights in the land they had inhabited for centuries.46 Although the
Meriam had been on the Murray Islands long before European settlement, the
British simply annexed the Murray Islands, subjecting the Meriam to British
rule.47
There were two claims made by the plaintiffs in the Mabo case.48 The
first was whether the annexation of Queensland in the Murray Islands vested
the Crown with complete ownership of the islands in addition to sovereignty,
or rather with sovereignty alone. 49 The second issue was whether native title
40 ABORIGINES, LAND AND LAND RIGHTS supra note 37, at 3.41 See, e.g., New South Wales v. Commonwealth (1975) 135 C.L.R 337 (Austl.); Coe v.
Commonwealth of Australia (1979) 24 A.L.R. 119 (Austl.).
42 The High Court is the highest judicial body in Australia. The High Court of Australia,
Operation of the Court, (visited Apr. 12, 1998) <http://www.hcourt.gov.au/Linklo.htm>.
43 Belinda Tasker, Wik Law Could Cause Buckelloads of Legislation: NIWG [National Indigenous
Working Group on Native Title], Austi. Assoc. Press Newsfeed, Sept. 23, 1997; see generally, Mabo v.
State of Queensland (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1 (Austl.).
" 1992 175 C.L.R I. The Mabo judgment is named after the late plaintiff, Eddie Mabo, who filed the
action. Narelle Hooper, Australia: GrowingAlarm on Mabo Impact, Bus. REv. WKLY, Mar. 12, 1993, at 32.
45 The three Murray Islands lie between Papua New Guinea and Cape York, Australia. The
islands' total area is about nine square kilometers or 3.25 square miles. Mabo, 175 C.L.R. at 16.
46 The plaintiffs did not debate the Crown's sovereignty, but rather whether the Crown actually
owned the Islands. Mabo. 175 C.L.R. at 9.
41 Mabo, 175 C.L.R. at 16. The plaintiffs in Mabo argued that the common law could recognize
native title in four key ways: under the rubric of traditional native title, which is a burden on the Crown's
title; as a result of local legal custom which was sufficiently certain and long standing; by the presumption
of lost grant; and the presumption of title founded on possession. For a full discussion of these claims, see
Argument of Counsel inMabo. 1992 175 C.L.R. at 8-15.
The plaintiffs supported their arguments by asserting that upon annexation of the islands in 1879, the
Crown legislation then in force failed to vest in the Crown the entire ownership of the land and extinguish native
title or possession. Mabo, 175 C.L.R. at 9. The plaintiffs also claimed that whether the test for native title is
occupation beyond living memory, or from the time of European settlement in 1788, the plaintiffs could still
claim title based on local native custom because they satisfy both tests. Id. at 10. They pointed out that Murray
Island practices regarding land use has continued operating in the same manner before and since annexation.
Id. at 12. In addition, the plaintiffs argued that the sovereign, Great Britain, never granted enough power to
enable Queensland to take steps to extinguish native title. Id at 13.
41 Id. at 178.
49 Id.
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to the Islands had ever existed, and if so, whether it had been extinguished by
official actions after colonial annexation.
50
Before turning to the precise issues raised in Mabo, Justice Brennan
addressed the doctrine of terra nullius. Brennan overturned two hundred
years of Australian property rights law in Mabo v. State of Queensland by
writing:
Whatever the justification advanced in earlier days for refusing
to recognize the rights and interests in land of the indigenous
inhabitants of settled colonies, an unjust and discriminatory
doctrine of that kind can no longer be accepted .... 51
With the stroke of a pen, the Court recognized native title to land and entirely
rejected the doctrine of terra nullius. 52
In addressing the specific issues before it, the High Court sided with
indigenous interests.53  The Court held that imperial annexation had not
vested the Crown with absolute ownership of the islands because that theory
of ownership was rooted in the now-void terra nullius doctrine. 54  In
answering whether native title to the islands had ever existed and, if so,
whether it had been extinguished by official actions after the annexation, 55 the
Court held that native title may continue to exist despite the settlement of
outsiders on the land.56 For continued native title to be found, two
requirements must be satisfied. 7 First, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
people must have maintained their connection with the land during the years
of settlement by outsiders.5 8  Second, Aboriginal title must not have been
extinguished by valid acts of an imperial, colonial, state, or territorial
government or act of the Commonwealth government. 59
50 Id.
"' Id. at 42.
52 id.
53 See generally id
SId. at 58.
I d. at 178.
16 Id. at 100.
5' See AUSTRALIAN HIGH COURT, MABo: THE HIGH COURT DECISION ON NATIVE TITLE DISCUSSION
PAPER 1 (1993); Mabo, 175 C.L.R. at 58-60.
5" Mabo, 175 C.L.R. at 59-60. For example, Aborigines may not assert a native title claim if they
no longer live on ancestral land. See AUSTRALIAN HIGH COURT, supra note 57, at 15.
" Mabo, 175 C.L.R. at 69. For example, a valid act would be appropriation of land to become a national
park. See AUSTRALIAN HIGH COURT, supra note 57, at 16.
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Importantly, the judiciary was not the only branch of government to
recognize the need for establishing a concrete means for determining whether
native title attached to land. Shortly after the Mabo decision, Parliament
enacted native title legislation, building on the native title test set out in the
Mabo opinion. 60
IV. THE NATIVE TITLE ACT 1993
A. Parliament's Reaction to the Mabo Decision
The Commonwealth Government recognized that the Mabo decision
warranted a major national response and it subsequently enacted legislation
addressing the issue. 61 Parliament sought to clarify legislatively what the
judiciary established in Mabo: that terra nullius was a closed chapter of
history and that indigenous people of Australia have native title rights.62
Parliament's efforts to codify Mabo resulted in the Native Title Act. The Act
was a significant legal policy initiative, responding to a wide range of issues
encompassed by native title rights.63
In the process of drafting the Native Title Act, indigenous leaders from
all over Australia negotiated directly with high government officials. 64 The
indigenous and governmental leaders agreed that the purpose of the NTA, as
stated in the Preamble, should be to "rectify the consequences of past
injustices[;] . . . [to secure] the adequate advancement and protection of
Aboriginal peoples and Torres Strait Islanders; and to ensure that Aboriginal
peoples and Torres Strait Islanders receive full recognition and status within
the Australian nation. 6 5
In order to achieve these ends, the leaders crafted the NTA with a
clearly-stated procedure, emphasizing the role of negotiation in resolving
native title claim disputes. 66  The resulting Act is one hundred pages and
addresses many of the logistics surrounding indigenous Australians' right to
60 Michael Lavarch, Foreward to NATIVE TITLE ACT 1993, at iii (1994).
61 id.
62 According to Michael Lavarch, the Australian Attorney-General in 1993, the Native Title Act
confirms the Mabo decision, particularly the fundamental propositions on which the decision rested,
namely: "the rejection of the myth that Australia was terra nullius... ; and the recognition of native title
rights based on the traditions of the indigenous people of Australia." Lavarch, supra note 60, at iii-iv.
63 id.
64 O'Donoghue, supra note 13, at 5.
65 Native Title Act, Preamble.
66 Id. §§ 24-44.
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native title, including native title application procedures, duties of the
registrar, and the representation of the Aboriginal/Torres Strait Islander
Bodies.67
B. Negotiation in the Native Title Act
Although negotiation was not mentioned in the Mabo decision per se,
the importance of negotiation to native title has been recognized since that
decision.68 In an official government explanation of Mabo published
immediately after the decision, the government noted the central role that
negotiation would play in determining native title.69  Accordingly, the
government itself agreed in 1993 that negotiation should be aimed at fair
compromises for all parties involved and it should be conducted between
native title holders and land developers.70
The right to negotiate is presented in the NTA as a right guaranteeing
native title claimants in specified land disputes an opportunity to negotiate
about the performance of specified future actions by other parties. The
actions invoking the right to negotiate are:
a) the creation of a right to mine, whether by the grant of a
mining lease or otherwise;
61 Part 3 of the Native Title Act deals with applications, Part 5 outlines the duties of the Registrar
(i.e., appointment of the registrar, powers of the registrar, and procedures for termination of employment),
and Part 11 discusses the Representative Aboriginalrorres Strait Islander Bodies (i.e., financial
assistance to representative Aboriginal/Torres Strait Islander Bodies). Id. §§ 61-79, 95-106, 202-03.
Along with fulfilling the purpose of the Mabo decision, the Native Title Act may have assisted in
the rejuvenation of indigenous pride. Interestingly, the five years since the Native Title Act was passed
have coincided with a feeling of increased efficacy and population pride among indigenous Australians.
See AUSTRALIAN BUREAU OF STATISTICS, 1996 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING IN AUSTRALIA,
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 2 (1996). Statistics show a correlation between the protections afforded native title
under Mabo and the Native Title Act and the number of Australians who identified themselves in the last
census as being of indigenous origin. Australian Bureau of Statistics. The number of self-identified
indigenous Australians increased by 33% between 1991 and 1996, from 265,458 to 352,970. The
Australian Bureau of Statistics attributes this increase to an "increased willingness [of Aborigines] to
declare their [i]ndigenous origin." Id. Considering that the Mabo decision came down in 1992, the 1991
figures could be used as a baseline measurement of indigenous self-identification before the decision's
repercussions were experienced. Of course, it is also possible that other factors, such as improved census
methods, could explain the change in self-identification.
6' In fact, the Native Title Act was drafted through a process of negotiations between indigenous
Australians and the Commonwealth Government. O'Donoghue, supra note 13, at 18.
69 AUSTRALIAN HIGH COURT, supra note 57, at 60-61.
'o O'Donoghue, supra note 13. at 5.
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b) the variation of such a right to mine, to extend the area to
which it relates;
c) the extension of the period for which such a right has effect,
other than under an option or right of extension or renewal
created by the lease, contract or other thing whose grant or
making created the right to mine;
d) the compulsory acquisition of native rights and interests...;
e) any other act approved by the Commonwealth Minister, in
writing, for the purposes of this paragraph.7'
The procedural steps by which these rights must be negotiated are
prescribed in the NTA.72 First, the government must issue a notice.73 Any
party that wishes to assert a claim in native title must respond to this notice
within four to six months. 74 The matter is then negotiated in a good faith
manner among the stakeholders.75 A good faith effort includes, but is not
limited to, a process that suggests a "view to obtaining the agreement of the
native title parties. '76 One of the negotiating parties may apply to an "arbitral
body" for mediation.77 The arbitral body must operate according to certain
constraints outlined in section 39(l)(a) of the NTA.78 The decision of that
7' Native Title Act, § 26(2)(a)-(e).
72 See id §§ 26-44.
73 Id. § 29.
74 Id. § 36(1).
" Id. § 31(1)(b).
76 Id.
7I Id. § 31(2).
's In making its determination about whether a proposed action (for example, development of a
mine) should be approved, the arbitral body must take into account the effects of the proposed action on
the following, under the Native Title Act, § 39(1) (a)-(f): any native title rights or interests, the culture of
any of "native title parties," the development of those parties, the freedom of access by any of those parties
to the land or waters, freedom to carry out rites, ceremonies or other activities of cultural or traditional
significance on the land or waters, the environment of the land or waters concerned, the economic or other
significance to Australia and the State or Territory concerned, any public interest in the doing of the act,
and any other matter that the arbitral body considers relevant. Id. § 39(l)(a)-(f).
It should be noted that consideration of the criteria:
place the arbitral decision-making process on a different footing from that upon which the
Minister would proceed. The requirements upon the arbitral body to consider the various listed
criteria determine to a degree the nature of the process which has to be undertaken by the
arbitral body and the minimum times within which that process can fairly be carried out.
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body is reviewable, and may be overturned under the "right of [a] state or
territory to overrule," which means that a state or territory can substitute its
opinion for that of the arbitral body.
79
Currently, the right to negotiate plays an integral role in indigenous
empowerment because it provides many indigenous Australians the ability
to actively protect their way of life. 80  As the Reconciliation and Social
Justice Library points out, the right to negotiate has, for the first time,
given Aborigines a real right to directly control the protection of their
culture. 8' They have a secure right to be involved in economic activity
through agreements that provide employment and wealth-generation
opportunities. 82  Aborigines can also control negative social impacts
related to developments in historic homelands. 83 The indigenous voice in
negotiations, which is so tightly bound to essential rights such as the
ability to earn a living and own land, is an essential component of future
amendments to the NTA. 84
V. PROPOSED PROTECTIONS OF THE RIGHT TO NEGOTIATE ARE WEAK
A. The Bias of the Amendments
While the protection of native rights under the current NTA has not
been perfect, the changes proposed by the current Prime Minister are biased
against indigenous interests. The Prime Minister of Australia, John Howard,
has proposed changes to the NTA featured in the Native Title Amendment
Bill 1997.85 These changes are biased in favor of the economic interests of
Justice R.S. French, Response to the Native Title Amendment Bill 1997, National Native Title Tribunal,
Sept. 1997, at § 39.
'9 Native Title Act, § 42.
80 See The Reconciliation and Social Justice Library, Chapter 4: The Right to Negotiate (visited on
Nov. 25, 1997) <http:www.austlii.edu.au/rsjlibrary/niwg/nt-4.html>.
81 Id.
82 id.
83 Id
84 A Native Title Claim Makes History, Australian Associated Press (Dec. 12, 1997). Native Title
claims have been successfully asserted under the NTA in two instances. A native title claim was
successfully negotiated by the Dunghuttii people in New South Wales in 1997. The Dunghuttii people
immediately handed the land over to the government for compensation. The land was subsequently
converted to a national park. In that same year, the Hopevale community in northern Queensland was
granted 110,000 hectares or 275,000 acres. Thirteen indigenous "clans" and other parties, including the
Queensland government, the Far North Queensland Electricity Corporation, and the Australian Maritime
Safety Authority, came to agreement. Id.
85 Note that there have been several Native Title Amendment Bills in 1995 and 1996, e.g. Native
Title Amendment Bill 1996 (Austl.).
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industry 6 and dramatically limit native title holders' right to negotiate. 7 The
purported purpose of the amendments is to "streamline the right to negotiate
processes so that unnecessary delays are eliminated while protecting the
legitimate interests of native title holders."88  Yet while the government
purports to have the interests of native title claimants at heart, the Prime
Minister tells another story. 89 He has openly admitted that proposed changes
to the right to negotiate in the Native Title Act are specifically designed to
simplify approval of mining deals when huge profits for the Australian
government, such as those derived from mining taxes, are on the line.90
The stormy Century Zinc Mine saga aptly demonstrates the tension in
the Native Title Act between indigenous property negotiation rights and the
competing concern for the expedient resolution of mining rights that is
supported by the Amendments. Century is the world's largest undeveloped
zinc deposit; it is located in Queensland, Australia.91 Pasminco, a mining
conglomerate, agreed to acquire the Century Project from another mining
company for a large sum, subject to the issuance of a valid mining lease. 92
Under the Native Title Act 1993, Pasminco had to negotiate mining rights
with local indigenous groups in Queensland before obtaining the lease. 93 The
parties failed to reach a negotiated settlement by the deadline imposed under
the NTA. 94 The impasse required parties to proceed to the arbitration phase,
where the parties finally reached agreement in May 1997, after a five-month
negotiation process. 95
Critics of native title legislation argue that the native title process has
resulted in the postponement of investment decisions for major mining
projects throughout Australia. For example, Senator Warwick Parer, the
Federal Resources Minister, asserted that the green light for the Century Zinc
mine purchase was unnecessarily delayed.96 He explains that for too long the
86 Elizabeth Keith, Neither Rights nor Workability. The ProposedAmendments to the Right to Negotiate,
NATIVE TITLES RESEARCH UNIr (Apr. 1997), available in Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander Studies <http://www.aiatsis.gov.au/ntpapers/ntip15.htn>.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Nikki Tait, Australia Plans Native Title Veto, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 10, 1996, at 35.
90 Id.
91 Australia Queensland's Century Zinc Mine Agreement Ends Stormy Native Title Claims Saga,FT Asia Intelligence Wire, May 9, 1997, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allnews File.
92 id.
93 id.
94 id.
95 Id.
96 id.
VOL. 7 No. 3
A USTRALIANNA TIVE TITLE RIGHTS
Australian economy has been deprived of significant jobs, training, and
financial benefits from the Century mine-all because the native title
negotiation system caused needless delay. 97
Prime Minister Howard stands squarely in the camp of staunch critics
of the current legislation. He has stated, "[tjo prevent a repeat of the Century
situation, the [federal] minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
affairs will be able to ensure that a project of major economic benefit to
Australia can proceed if it appears that ... benefit will be lost if a decision is
not made urgently." 98  In other words, if it is important to the rest of
Australia's economy, "details" like negotiating with native title claimants
should be suspended. Howard favors this new process which he calls
"streamlin[ing]" because "it is only necessary for a mining project to go
through the [negotiation] process once .... "99
Many Australians are concerned about the impact the amendments may
have on native rights, however. For example, the National Indigenous Working
Group on Native Title warns that the government's biased amendments to the
NTA pending in Parliament threaten the reconciliation process between native
Australians and those of immigrant descent.' °° Spokesperson for the group,
Aden Ridgeway, predicts that if the amendments go through unchanged, they will
leave an "open racial sore" on Australia.' 0' If such concerns are not heeded, the
amendments will compromise native title rights.
B. The Proposed Amendments and Their Effects
There are two main problems with the current NTA amendments.
First, they provide loopholes which permit negotiating procedures to be
9' Id. On the other hand, proponents of the native title system of negotiations, such as Justice
Robert French, President of the Native Title Tribunal, have a different view of the Century mine story.
They emphasize the end result, claiming that negotiation talks led the way to the agreement and that,
although difficult, the talks underscored the worth of the NTA and the procedures it requires. Id.
98 Tait, supra note 89.
" Id. Howard refers to the 1996 proposed amendments here. See Native Title Act Amendment Bill
1996. The goals of the 1996 amendments apply to the 1997 amendments, as well. The primary difference
between the two sets of amendments is that the 1997 amendments place additional limitations on
indigenous rights, by including increased restrictions on the right to negotiate. See Jennifer Clarke, The
Native Title Act Amendment Bill 1997, 4 INDIGENOUs L. BUL. 4, 6 (1997); SENATE'S SUPPLEMENTARY
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM TO THE NATIVE TITLE AMENDMENT BILL 1996, at 2 (1996). The 1996
amendments foreshadowed the restrictions that would be placed on native title claimants in the 1997
amendments. Id.
100 Tasker, supra note 43.
1o1 Id.
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circumvented. 10 2  Second, they rush negotiations, thereby emphasizing the
quantity of time reaching agreement, rather than the quality of the
agreement. 10 3 While efficiency is an important goal, meaningful negotiation
should follow mutually-agreed upon, consistent procedures.' 4 Furthermore,
quick resolution of claims should not come at the expense of quality
discussion. 0 5 It is also apparent from the proposed amendments that mining
opportunities for would-be developers are enhanced. 106
At the heart of the dispute over revisions of the Native Title Act is the
tension between negotiation and streamlining, as exemplified in the Century
Mine situation. 10 7  The current amendments jeopardize negotiation for the
sake of expediency. If passed, amendment sections 26A, 26D, and 43A will
change current law to limit native title claimants' right to negotiate. 10 8
Importantly, in the current NTA, section 26A concerns the conditions that
must be satisfied before a minister can grant approval for mineral mining
projects. 109 These conditions include assessing the degree of impact on
indigenous peoples by the activity, notification of representative bodies and
the public, and invitations to make submissions of proposed actions and
consideration of those submissions.1 Under proposed section 26A(3),
however, the agency ministers would be able to approve the exploration by a
mining company simply because they consider the mining activity "unlikely to
have a significant impact on the particular land or waters concerned.""' If
adopted, section 26A(3) would weaken the participation requirement of
successful negotiation because it empowers ministers to exclude native title
claimants from having an influential voice in these expedited decisions. 112
102 See, e.g., Native Title Amendment Bill 1997, §§ 26A, 26D, 43A.
103 See, e.g., id § 34A, § 36A.
14 Daniel McCool, Indian Water Settlements: The Prerequisites of Successful Negotiation, 21
POL'Y STUD. J. 227 (1993).los David Straus, Facilitated Collaborative Problem Solving and Process Management, in
NEGOTIATION: STRATEGIES FOR MuTuAL GAIN 28, 37 (Lavinia Hall ed., 1993).
:06 See, e.g., Native Title Amendment Bill 1997, §§ 26A, 26D, 43A.
07 Australia Queensland's Century Zinc Mine Agreement Ends Stormy Native Title Claims
Saga, supra note 91.
108 Tamara Karmen, Implications of the Proposed Amendments to the Native Title Act, NATIVE TITLE
RESEARCH UNIT (Nov. 20, 1997), available in Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Studies <http://www.aiatsis.gov.au/ntpaperst ntipl9.htm>.
1o9 Native Title Amendment Bill 1997, § 26A.
110 Id.
"' Id § 26A(3). The amendment does not require ministers to consult experts in order to determine
the environmental impact of proposed actions, such as mineral mining projects, nor does it explain how
ministers are to acquire expertise in environmental assessment.
112 For a discussion of the importance of participation in negotiation, see McCool, supra note
104, at 227, 233.
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Another means by which the amendments weaken the right to negotiate
is by limiting negotiation to a single opportunity for each project proposed by
mining interests, even if the mining plan changes after the negotiation. 113
Section 26D is known as the "once only" right because one negotiation
suffices for the length of a project. 1 4 The "once only" right provides a
windfall for mining interests because mining companies can change their
plans after negotiations with indigenous Australians are over.115 If a valid
earlier right to mine that was commenced on or before December 23, 1996 is
renewed, re-granted, or the term extended, the right to negotiate provisions
would be inapplicable. 116
In addition, where a right to mine is created after a right to explore is
granted, the right to negotiate does not apply to the former, even if the mining
project changes drastically between the negotiations and the actual
implementation of the project. 17 The "once only" right under section 26D
will thwart negotiation rights because projects evolve between their initial
phases and more developed stages.1 8 "The current dual right to negotiate [is
preferable because it] recognizes both the fundamental practical differences
between rights to prospect and rights to mine." ' 1 9  It would often be
impractical to negotiate at the exploration phase, considering that potential
mining projects are not yet officially planned. The subsequent stages of a
project could be entirely different from the negotiated project. Consequently,
it should not be assumed that a project once approved would remain
unobjectionable.
Further weakening the indigenous right to negotiate, section 43A
proposes that if a Commonwealth minister finds that state and territory
provisions governing real property transactions were adequate, then the right
to negotiate within the context of the NTA would be satisfied.120 Allowing
states and territories to circumvent national procedures under section 43A
decreases the protection of native title by leaving the Commonwealth
ministers with discretion over the alternative procedures and restricting the
... Native Title Amendment Bill 1997, § 26D.
114 Kamien, supra note 108, at 10.
115 Id
116 Native Title Amendment Bill 1997, § 26D.
117 id.
118 Kamien, supra note 108.
19 Id.
120 The Commonwealth minister must make the determination in writing that state or territorial
provisions adequately protect the right to negotiate. Native Title Amendment Bill 1997, § 43A.
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geographic area over which the right to negotiate applies. 2 1 Thus, states and
territories would be permitted to use procedures contrary to those outlined in
the right to negotiate.122 This permission violates the tenet of negotiation that
requires set, mutually-agreed upon procedures.' 2 3  Although the
circumstances under which amendment 43A applies are limited, 124 the very
existence of an alternative to following negotiation procedures drastically
undermines the value of having a set system of negotiation in the first place
because it can then be avoided. 125
In addition to the new exclusions discussed above, the amendments
include several procedural changes to the right to negotiate in sections 34A
and 36A. Proposed 34A calls for an official to intervene and make a binding
decision if negotiations become stalled. 126  The official may cut short
negotiations as long as at least three months have passed since all parties
were notified of the proposed land action and the official has complied with
the requirements of section 36B dealing with application for arbitral body
determination. 127  While in theory the goal of facilitating the resolution of
negotiations may seem just, in practice the negotiation would hardly be under
way before the official could intervene and make a decision independently of
negotiating parties. 28
:21 Kamien, supra note 108.
122 Native Title Act, §§ 26-44.
123 McCool, supra note 104, at 227, 236. The Amendments may also violate the Racial
Discrimination Act ("RDA"), which has two operative sections. Section 9 of the RDA makes it unlawful
for a person to commit any act involving a distinction based on race resulting in the impaired enjoyment
of any human right or fundamental freedom. Section 10 provides that where by reason of any law persons
of a particular race do not enjoy a right to the same extent as persons of another race, then by force of
section 10 of the RDA, the first-mentioned persons enjoy that right to the same extent. Racial
Discrimination Act, 1975, §§ 9-10 (Austl.).
124 Negotiation can be circumscribed when the provisions relate to State or Territory acts dealing
with land subject to a non-exclusive lease, or reserved for public purposes. Native Title Amendment Bill
1997, § 43A. Formation of a national park, for example, would not require negotiation because it is land
reserved for public purposes. French, supra note 78, §43A. The alternative procedures to qualify for
authorization must give native title holders equivalent procedural rights to those of the non-exclusive
lessee and, where there is not a lease over the area, make provisions for notification, negotiation, objection
and compensation in relation to the act they propose. id.
125 Problems arise in the "gray" area when the minister determines whether or not a state or
territorial provision meets the criteria because the minister has very wide discretion.
126 Native Title Amendment Bill 1997, § 34A.127 Id.
128 Id. For example, under proposed section 34A, a mining company and an indigenous group could
be negotiating the plans for a new mine. Just three months after the parties were notified of the
impending negotiation, a governmental official would be able to step in and make a decision; negotiations
need not have even begun.
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Amendment 34A also threatens to prevent meaningful negotiation
because it imposes arbitrary time limits. Ample time is a prerequisite "to
mak[ing] collaborative processes work.' '129 Under section 34A, a native title
party that becomes registered only at the end of the negotiation period would
be limited to a very brief period of negotiation because the amendments
reduce the negotiation period from six months in some instances 130 to a
mandatory four months in every case. 131 Instead of rigid deadlines, time
limits should be discretionary, depending on the time constraints for the
particular negotiation. Time limits should be the first order of business
determined by the negotiating parties. Discretionary time limits would
alleviate pressure on negotiating parties to rush, thereby emphasizing the
quality of their efforts to reach agreement, rather than the quantity of time in
which the agreement is achieved. And finally, the amendments never define
what constitutes an "urgent" or "significant" case in which ministerial
determination would be appropriate.
Proposed amendment 36A 132 also allows for early ministerial
intervention when it is in the "national interest" to reach an accelerated
agreement,133 again curtailing the negotiation process. Amendment 36A
would result in rushed negotiations under the threat of possible early
ministerial interference, thereby allowing officials to bypass so-called
"delayed" negotiations. A minister may intervene and make a decision
independent of on-going negotiations provided the negotiating parties have
not reached agreement and it would be in the national interest to intervene.'
34
The original NTA had no such provision allowing the minister to act
arbitrarily, as long as he or she considers it in the "national interest."
In addition to requiring parties to expedite their negotiations, thereby
jeopardizing the quality of negotiations, section 36A would codify a double
standard because ministers would not have to follow the same procedures
aimed at protecting indigenous parties as an arbitral body 135 when making
native title determinations. 136
129 Straus, supra note 105, at 37.
130 Native Title Act, § 36(l)(b).
131 Native Title Act, § 36(3); Kamien, supra note 108.
132 Proposed amendment 36B regards "[clonsultation prior to Section 34A or 36A determination."
Section 36C deals with "Section 34A and 36A determinations." All of these amendments are interrelated,
but they need not be detailed here because they are sufficiently similar to Section 36A.
133 See Native Title Amendment Bill 1997, § 36A(2)(c)(i).
134 id.
135 The usual procedure is for negotiating parties to go to the arbitral body when they reach a
stalemate or need extra assistance in reaching agreement. Native Title Act, § 35. Under section 35 of the
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In summary, the pending amendments to the Native Title Act threaten a
right that all Australians possess: to have and preserve a seat at the
negotiating table.137 Despite the fact that streamlining is a worthy goal, 38 the
proposed amendments will do more harm than good by muting indigenous
voices in an arena where their views are crucial. The proposed legislation
shows that the struggle for indigenous Australians to protect their land rights
in Australia has not ended with Mabo or subsequent decisions affecting the
rights and interests of Aborigines in land. 139
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
The primary dispute over revisions of the Native Title Act is the
tension between negotiation and efficiency. On the one hand, the
Australian government has officially noted the importance of negotiation
in carrying out the changes implemented by Mabo. 140  On the other hand,
negotiation requires time, patience, and predictability. 141 The
government's current amendments do not express a realistic
acknowledgement of that fact. It is not surprising that when the
government drafts amendments without the input of interested parties, the
amendments tend to favor governmental interests. Indigenous concerns
current NTA, "[any negotiation party may apply to the arbitral body for a determination in relation to the
act if there is no such agreement" within four to six months, depending on the circumstances. Id.136 Section 39 of the NTA currently requires the Tribunal to take into account a variety of factors,
such as the effect of the act on the enjoyment by the native title parties of their determined or claimed
native title rights and interests. Native Title Act, § 39.137 See generally Keith, supra note 86.
138 That only two conflicts resolved under the Native Title Act have led to a successful agreement
demonstrates that streamlining and other reforms are needed to improve the workability of the Act. See A
Native Title Claim Makes History, supra note 84.
139 See, e.g., Wik Peoples v. Queensland, (1996) 141 A.L.R. 129 (Austl.). In Wik Peoples, the issue
was whether a pastoral lease confers rights to exclusive possession on the grantee (i.e., the pastoralist).
The High Court established that native title could only be extinguished by a written law or an act of the
government showing a plain intention to extinguish native title. Id.
The Court reasoned that the pastoral leases in Queensland were not intended to extinguish native
title. Id. Pastoral leases come from Australian statutory law rather than from English common law. Id.
Australians developed pastoral leases to meet the special needs of the emerging Australian pastoral
industry. Id. The leases did not give exclusive possession to the pastoralists (exclusive possession is
defined as not requiring that owners share land with others). Id A pastoral lease would not necessarily
extinguish all native title rights. Native title rights could continue at the same time that the land was
subject to a pastoral lease. Id Where there is conflict in the exercise of those rights, native title rights
were subordinate to those of the pastoral lessee. Id. See also, Western Australia v. Commonwealth,(1995) 183 C.L.R. 373 (Austl.); Coe v. Commonwealth, (1993) 118 A.L.R. 193 (Austl.).140 See generally AUSTRALIAN HIGH COURT, supra note 57.141 See Straus, supra note 105.
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are lacking in the present proposals. Importantly, the goals of a
streamlined procedure and negotiations that fairly represent all views need
not be incompatible goals. However, the solution has eluded the
government's current proposals. Given the recent gains in indigenous
rights under Mabo and the NTA, the post-Mabo era presents the potential
for indigenous Australians to own a voice in the future of their rights. It
would be wrong for the government to miss this opportunity to give all
Australians an opportunity to be heard.
Thus, in order for the amendments to the NTA to effect the desired
goals of streamlined procedures that fairly represent all interests, the
parties concerned should draft the changes together. 142  The Native Title
Act was originally drafted cooperatively between indigenous peoples and
the Commonwealth Government, 143 and the Act should be revised through
similar cooperation. 144 It is only through the efforts of all concerned
parties that a system can evolve to carry forth the principles established in
Mabo. 1
45
Whether or not the government does consult with indigenous
leaders, there is still a primary way that the right to negotiate in the NTA
could be improved. Under section 26 of the current version of the NTA,
the Commonwealth minister can choose to exclude many proposed actions
142 The head of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, Lois O'Donoghue, who is an
indigenous Australian, points out:
Ultimately, direct negotiation by the [g]ovemment with indigenous interests is essential... A
number of the current amendment proposals ... are either not acceptable or are unworkable. It
is important for the future management of land and resources in Australia that decisions about
the provisions of the NTA are reached on a cooperative and constructive basis. Otherwise the
process will leave a legacy of resentment and distrust.
O'Donoghue, supra note 13 at 28.
For a discussion of the importance of indigenous involvement in drafting negotiation procedures, see
McCool, supra note 104, at 227, 236; Lara Elizabeth Burgel, Native American Reserved Water Rights:
The Legal and Historical Development of a Modern Dilemma 119 (1996) (unpublished B.A. senior
fellowship thesis, Dartmouth College) (on file with the Dartmouth College Libraries).
143 The consultations were directed by the Committee of Ministers, convened in October 1992,
chaired by the Prime Minister, and consisting of the Attorney-General, the Minister for Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Affairs, and other ministers. AUSTRALIAN HIGH COURT, supra note 57, at 10-11.
Among the consultation participants were: commissioners and chairpeople of the Aboriginal and Tones
Strait Islander Commission, the Northern Land Council, the Central Land Council, the Cape York Land
Council, the Kimberley Land Council, the New South Wales Aboriginal Land Council, the Aboriginal
Legal Service of Western Australia, the Australian Mining Industry Council, the Australian Petroleum
Exploration Association, the National Farmers Federation, state and territory governments, and the
Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation. Id. In April and May 1993, meetings were held with
representatives of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people and industry representatives. Id.
144 See O'Donoghue, supra note 13.
145 Lavarch, supra note 60, at iii-iv.
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from negotiation eligibility. 146 The list of exclusions in section 26 applies
to actions that the minister thinks will have "minimal effect on any native
title concerned.' 4 7 Native rights are severely curtailed when the native
parties' ability to "come to the table" has been entirely destroyed by the
opinion of the Commonwealth minister. This sweeping discretionary
power to exclude certain actions vitiates severely the right to negotiate
within the NTA. The power to exclude should not exist; there should be
no acts excisable by ministerial discretion.
VII. CONCLUSION
Just six years after the historic Mabo decision that eliminated terra
nullius,148 the Australian government is on the verge of impairing
indigenous rights to land in favor of policies that privilege special interests
such as the mining industry. This change in course now, away from the
structure currently set up in the NTA to protect indigenous rights, would
set in motion the deterioration of those rights. Indigenous parties deserve
the same rights today as they were granted both under Mabo and the
Native Title Act. Indigenous peoples and government officials should
work together to revise and improve the Act.149
The overarching purpose of the government's amendments is to
"streamline the right to negotiate processes so that unnecessary delays are
eliminated while protecting the legitimate interests of native title
holders."' 150 Unfortunately, the amendments are biased in favor of industry
interests, particularly those of mining companies. These biases lie at the
root of the two main problems with the NTA amendments: they provide
loopholes so that negotiation procedures can be avoided' 51 and they
needlessly rush negotiation.15 2
At its core, the dispute concerning revisions of the Native Title Act
involves a tension between negotiation and streamlining. Streamlining
requires speed, but negotiation takes time. 53 The government's current
amendments do not resolve or even address that conflict. This outcome is
146 Native Title Act, § 26.
147 Id. § 26(4).
148 Mabo v. State of Queensland (1992) 175 C.L R. I (Austi.).149 See O'Donoghue, supra note 13, at 18.
ISo Keith, supra note 86, at 3.
151 See, e.g., Native Title Amendment Bill 1997, §§ 26A, 26D, 43A.
152 Native Title Amendment Bill 1997, §§ 34A. 36A.
153 See Straus, supra note 105, at 37.
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most unfortunate because the goals of streamlined procedures and
negotiations that fairly represent all views need not be incompatible.
The post-Mabo era presents an unprecedented opportunity for
indigenous Australians to own a voice in the future of their rights. Just as
they jointly wrote the original Native Title Act, governmental and
indigenous leaders need to work cooperatively, in a spirit of mutual trust,
to draft amendments together. Only then will they strike a balance
between procedural efficiency and a secure right to negotiate.

